| Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams | |
|---|---|
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Citation(s) | [1957] 1 WLR 370 |
| Case opinions | |
| Denning LJ | |
| Keywords | |
| Term, representation, intention | |
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 is an English contract law case, concerning the difference between a term and a representation.
Contents |
Williams sold Oscar Chess Ltd a Morris car for £290. It was described as a 1948 Morris 10, but it was really a 1939 model worth £175. Williams said it was 1948 in good faith, relying on the car log book, but the book was a forgery.
Denning LJ said the only possible remedy was a warranty, whose ordinary meaning is ‘to denote a binding promise’. This comes from Chandelor v Lopus (1603) Cro.Jac 4. In Cross v Gardner (1689) Cart. 90, Holt CJ held that ‘An affirmation at the time of a sale is a warranty, provided it appears on evidence to be so intended.’ And this was the ordinary English meaning of a binding promise. But in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30</ref> Lord Haldane LC and Lord Moulton said ‘warranty’ in a technical sense, distinguished from a condition. The crucial point of this case was not whether the representation was a warranty or condition, but a term of the contract at all. Williams’ statement was a mere representation.
| “ | One final word… [the motor dealers only checked the log book] eight months later. They are experts, and, not having made that check at the time, I do not think they should now be allowed to recover against the innocent seller who produced to them all the evidence he had, namely, the registration book... If the rogue can be traced, he can be sued by whomsoever has suffered the loss: but if he cannot be traced, the loss must lie where it falls. It should not be inflicted on innocent sellers, who sold the car many months, perhaps many years before…’ | ” |
Here we can see that the statement did not become a term because a reasonable man (objective test) in the position of the car dealer (Oscar Chess Ltd) would not have thought that a person with no experience in the car market would have guaranteed the truth of the statement.
So the third principle is that the balance of information power between the parties, or one party’s special knowledge, affects whether a representation is a term.
Hodson LJ concurred and Morris LJ dissented because he thought the parties did intend it to be a warranty.
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